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How have patterns of ethnic exclusion and discrimination evolved around the world, and spe-
cifically in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region before and after the Arab 
Spring? How do these developments affect ethnic civil war, and are there any links to pro-
cesses of democratization? In this contribution, we present some tentative answers to these 
questions, using the newly updated Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Family (Vogt et al. 
Forthcoming), which extends previous versions of the data until 2013 and introduces a new 
coding of regional autonomy regimes for ethnic groups. 
The revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring constitute the most significant instances 
of political upheaval and regime change in the last decade. On the one hand, they have top-
pled some of the most resilient dictatorial rulers of the world. On the other hand, some of the 
popular uprisings have ushered in protracted civil conflicts, causing tremendous human suf-
fering, as in Syria, for example. These revolutions and the current situation are also significant 
because they raise the issue of the feasibility of achieving peaceful coexistence of different 
ethnic – mainly religious – groups within democratically constituted polities in a region that 
has not only been a laggard with regard to protecting democratic rights, but also in terms of 
entrenched policies and practices of ethnic exclusion and discrimination. Apart from the eth-
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nically more homogeneous population of Tunisia, most states in the region are divided by 
ethnic cleavages, comprising important religious and/or linguistic minorities. In contrast to a 
long-lasting, worldwide trend towards ethnically inclusive governments, on the eve of the 
Arab Spring many regimes in the MENA region continued to rely on the dominance of specif-
ic ethnic groups, to the exclusion of others. Thus, the introduction of democratic rule in the 
region may result in what one observer called a “fragmentation bomb” (Gardner 2012). 
Although the events of the Arab Spring are still of recent memory, making an evalua-
tion of the outcomes tentative at best, political instability and violence along ethno-religious 
cleavages have indeed been observed with regularity throughout the MENA region. After the 
collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011 led to competitive elections in 2012, Libya 
has descended into civil war with little semblance of central governance. A similar sequence 
transpired in Yemen: the resignation of Ali Abdullah Salei in 2012 led to a transitional gov-
ernment, headed by a consensus candidate for the presidential election, Abd Rabbuh Mansur 
Hadi, who was then ousted by a sectarian rebellion that has turned into full-scale civil war. 
Other cases (for example, Bahrain and Syria) only flirted with political openings, while exhib-
iting varying degrees of violence ranging from brutal repression of opposition mobilization to 
severe violent conflict – all marked by a pronounced ethnic overtone.  
Scholars analyzing the events of the Arab Spring have mainly focused on political in-
stitutions and the role of civil society movements (see, e.g., Lynch 2014b; for an overview see 
also Lynch 2014a). Similarly, classic explanations of the link between democratic transitions 
and political violence have emphasized the role of institutional weakness (Huntington 1968; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2002). In contrast, we argue that ethnic inclusion is a prerequisite for 
peaceful transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Our analysis of the updated 
EPR Dataset Family reveals a clear relationship between ethnic exclusion and ethnic civil war 
in the MENA region in the past. From this perspective, the violent unraveling of the popular 
movements of the Arab Spring cannot come as a surprise. In the light of our findings, the con-
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tinuing high levels of ethnic exclusion in the MENA region after the Arab Spring are alarm-
ing. They suggest that the future of these states is likely to be shaped by how they will man-
age inter-ethnic relations in the face of potential future democratization. 
 
Democracy and Ethnic Inclusion: The MENA Region in a Global Comparison 
Before the revolutionary political changes, the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) 
constituted the most repressive and undemocratic region in the world.1 Whereas other parts of 
the world have successively either caught up with the high level of democracy observed 
across the advanced industrial countries or joined in the democratic improvements experi-
enced by many developing countries, most states in the MENA region experienced little if any 
democratization. As Figure 1 shows, the Arab World has been – for nearly two decades – the 
only region where the average level of democracy falls below the midpoint of the standard 
Polity IV scale (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989), lagging well behind the changes in every 
other region. Despite a modest positive trend since 1980, more countries in the MENA region 
continue to lean towards strong authoritarianism than towards democracy. 
 
1 See Appendix I for a list of all countries considered to be part of the MENA region in this study. The table also 
shows the regional classification of all other countries. 
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Figure 1: Regional trends in levels of democracy 
 
Notes: Based on the Polity IV index (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989). The figure shows the average Polity values of all 
countries in a given region from 1946 to 2013. 
 
The countries in the MENA region are also laggards in terms of the political inclusion 
of ethnic groups. Figures 2 and 3 show the average levels of ethnic exclusion and discrimina-
tion, relying on the updated EPR Core Dataset (Vogt et al. Forthcoming), for the same world 
regions as displayed in Figure 1 over the period from 1946 to 2013. The EPR data distinguish 
between politically included and excluded groups based on group leaders’ access to national 
executive power.2 Ethnic discrimination is a particularly severe subtype of exclusion, defined 
by EPR as the active, intentional, and targeted discrimination of members of specific ethnic 
groups, with the intent of excluding them from political power based on their ethnic identity.3 
2 The EPR dataset is arguably the most comprehensive data source on ethnic group inclusion, covering the whole 
time period since World War II up to 2013 and, thus, going clearly beyond the temporal reach of other datasets 
on ethnic group political representation. For example, Ruedin’s (2013) data on descriptive representation in 
legislatures only covers a single year, while the discrimination indicators of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) da-
taset are available from 1980 on (Minorities at Risk Project 2003). Moreover, although MAR offers a very de-
tailed measurement of different types of discrimination, it is less precise on ethnic groups’ political representa-
tion. 
3 For a more precise description of the EPR data and the power statuses of ethnic groups, see the corresponding 
chapter in Peace and Conflict 2014 (Cederman, Girardin, and Wucherpfennig 2014). 
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Figures 2 and 3 rely on aggregated country-level measures indicating the relative size of polit-
ically excluded or discriminated ethnic groups as a share of the overall population. 
 
Figure 2: Regional levels of ethnic exclusion over time 
 
Notes: Based on the EPR Core Dataset (Vogt et al. Forthcoming). The figure shows the regional average values of the rela-
tive size of politically excluded ethnic groups as a share of the total country population between 1946 and 2013. 
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Figure 3: Regional levels of ethnic discrimination over time 
 
Notes: Based on the EPR Core Dataset. The figure shows the regional average values of the relative size of politically dis-
criminated ethnic groups as a share of the total country population between 1946 and 2013. 
 
In terms of the broader measure of exclusion, the world regions fall into three clusters. 
The West – defined here as Western Europe, plus Cyprus and the former colonies of Austral-
ia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – has been characterized by consistently low 
levels of ethnic exclusion since World War II, according to the EPR dataset. Latin America, 
Asia, Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa are situated at the intermediate level. The ab-
rupt initiation of democratization in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s also led to a 
considerable increase in ethnic exclusion in that region. After experiencing decades of high 
levels of ethnic exclusion after independence and during the Cold War, Sub-Saharan Africa 
entered the intermediate category after 1990, exhibiting the steepest decrease on this measure 
of any region. Hence, the impact of democratization on ethnic inclusion in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca differed significantly from the pattern observed in Eastern Europe around the same time. 
The Arab World exhibits the highest values of ethnic exclusion. The MENA region experi-
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enced a notable decrease in the degree of ethnic exclusion before the Arab Spring, as a result 
of power-sharing arrangements adopted in Sudan and in Iraq after the US-led invasion. Fol-
lowing the Arab Spring, ethnic exclusion increased slightly, although it is still too early to 
judge whether this constitutes the beginning of a systematic trend similar to the developments 
in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. Overall, the regimes of these countries still 
exclude groups that, on average, make up over a third of the population from access to nation-
al state power based on ethnic identity. 
The picture becomes even gloomier when we examine the more narrow measure of 
ethnic discrimination. Ethnic discrimination, as defined by the EPR data, is almost completely 
absent in the West, while Sub-Saharan Africa again has experienced the steepest decrease in 
ethnic discrimination over the last decades. The values in the MENA region have been much 
higher than those of all other world regions since the early 1980s. In the 2000s, levels of dis-
crimination decreased somewhat, mostly due to the end of Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq and 
smaller improvements in Libya at the beginning of the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, ethnic dis-
crimination in the region is actually still more prevalent today than it was 70 years ago and, 
on average, still affects substantial portions of these countries’ populations. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the levels of ethnic exclusion and discrimination for each coun-
try of the MENA region in 2013.4 Almost all countries in the region exclude at least some 
ethnic minorities from access to meaningful political power at the national level. Among the 
conspicuous examples is the highly exclusionary Assad dictatorship in Syria, which is com-
pletely based on Assad’s fellow Shia Alawites. More than half the countries discriminate 
against an ethnically defined section of their population. Certain cases are particularly strik-
ing: two ethnic groups that experience discrimination, Shia Arabs in Bahrain and Palestinians 
in Jordan, make up more than 50 percent of their respective countries’ populations. 
 
4 EPR treats the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as de facto parts of Israel and Western Sahara as part of Morocco. 
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Figure 4: Share of the Excluded Population in 2013  
 
Notes: According to the EPR Core Dataset. The exclusion values are aggregate country-level measures indicating the rela-
tive size of politically excluded ethnic groups as a share of the total country population. 
 
 
Figure 5: Share of the Discriminated Population in 2013  
 
Notes: According to the EPR Core Dataset. The discrimination values are aggregate country-level measures indicating the 
relative size of politically discriminated ethnic groups as a share of the total country population. 
 
Ethnic exclusion and discrimination are not uniquely Arab or Muslim phenomena within the 
MENA region. A number of the most severe instances of ethnic exclusion occur between dif-
ferent Arab groups or Muslim denominations – for example, Alawite Shia and other Arab 
groups in Syria, Jordanians and Palestinian Arabs in Jordan, and Shia and Sunni Muslims in 
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Bahrain. Yet ethnic exclusion is also pronounced in Israel, Turkey, and Iran, where non-Arabs 
exclude and discriminate against Arabs, Kurds, and other minorities. Historically, this has led 
to a higher frequency of violent conflict across linguistic, rather than religious, divisions in 
the MENA region (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt Forthcoming). Moreover, as the examples 
of Israel and Turkey demonstrate, democratic institutions do not ensure ethnic equality in all 
cases. To the contrary, the dominance of the ethnic majority at the ballot box often brings 
about democracy’s dark side (Mann 2005). 
Finally, the updated EPR Core Dataset also allows us to compare regional trends in 
ethnic autonomy provisions. Previous versions of EPR coded regional autonomy status as a 
subcategory of exclusion at the national level. The 2014 version introduces a new dichoto-
mous regional autonomy variable, which is coded for both excluded and power-sharing 
groups.5 For a group to be coded as regionally autonomous, the circumstances must jointly 
satisfy three conditions (Vogt et al. Forthcoming): 
1. A meaningful and active regional executive organ that operates below the state 
level (for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level), but above the lo-
cal administrative level, must exist.6 
2. This regional entity must have de facto (as opposed to mere de jure) political pow-
er. 
3. Group representatives must exert actual influence on the decisions of this entity, 
acting in line with the group’s local interests. 
The Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq is an example of meaningful political 
power at the sub-state level that is coded as regional autonomy in the new EPR Core Dataset 
(Katzman 2010). 
5 Note that the autonomy dimension is not coded for “monopoly” and “dominant” groups, since their political 
interests are assumed to be sufficiently represented at the level of the central state. Figure 6 shows the relative 
size of groups with regional autonomy, as a share of all groups eligible for autonomy. 
6 Here, “meaningful” refers to executive organs that carry out core competencies of the state, involving, for ex-
ample, cultural rights (language and education) and/or significant economic autonomy (e.g., the right to levy 
taxes, or very substantial spending autonomy). 
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Figure 6 reveals that the MENA region also ranks last in terms of ethnic autonomy, 
although the disparity relative to other world regions is less pronounced than with the other 
indicators discussed earlier. Autonomy provisions are even less frequent in the MENA region 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has been identified as possessing few favorable conditions 
for the enactment of ethnic autonomy (Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999). Yet, in the face of the 
centrifugal forces unleashed by the current ethno-religious violence, most importantly by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ethno-federalist formulae may be a crucial institutional 
tool to hold together the multi-ethnic polities in the MENA region and to offer guarantees to 
discontented minorities in the future (Gardner 2014). At the other end of the scale, established 
democracies in the West provide the most autonomy to ethnically distinct groups. In Eastern 
Europe, a frontrunner in terms of ethnic autonomy rights during the Cold War, the demise of 
the communist regimes and the formation of ethnically more homogenous nation states not 
only increased the levels of ethnic exclusion in the central government, but also abrogated 
many autonomy regimes. The other meaningful trend over the past twenty years concerns 
states in Latin America that extended autonomy to many indigenous groups (González 2010; 
Van Cott 2001, 2007). 
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Figure 6: Regional trends in ethnic autonomy provisions 
 
Notes: Based on the regional autonomy variable of the EPR Core Dataset. The figure shows the regional average values of 
the relative size of groups with regional autonomy as a share of all groups eligible for autonomy (i.e. excluding monopoly 
and dominant groups) between 1946 and 2013. 
 
Ethnic Exclusion and Civil Conflict 
How do patterns of ethnic exclusion relate to the outbreak of civil war – arguably the most 
important form of political violence since World War II (Gleditsch et al. 2002)? Using data 
from the updated EPR Dataset Family covering the period from 1946 to 2013, our analyses 
reaffirm existing findings that link ethnic exclusion to a higher risk of ethnic conflict both 
globally and for the MENA region in particular.  
Specifically, we estimate the probability of civil war onset for each ethnic group-year, 
relying on the ACD2EPR dataset, which identifies ethnic conflicts by linking EPR groups to 
rebel organizations from the 2014 version of UCDP/PRIO’s Armed Conflict Database 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014).7 Figure 7 displays the most important 
7 In the ACD2EPR dataset, a rebel organization is linked to an ethnic group from the EPR Core Dataset if it both 
recruited fighters from the ethnic group and made public claims on behalf of it (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). 
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results from our logistic regression analysis for both the global sample of countries (black) 
and a sub-sample composed of all countries in the MENA region (grey).8 Holding all other 
variables at their respective means, medians, or modes, we computed the predicted probability 
of ethnic civil war onset by moving the three variables from “0” to “1”.9 The results make 
clear that the likelihood of engaging in ethnic rebellions is significantly greater among politi-
cally excluded ethnic groups, groups that experienced a recent downgrading of their power 
status, and groups with a history of conflict with the state. While the estimated results are less 
precise for the far smaller sample of ethnic groups in the MENA region,10 they are consistent 
with the global pattern. Indeed, 37 of 46 (80%) recorded ethnic conflicts in that region were 
fought by excluded ethnic groups. In short, these results suggest that the violent rebellions of 
the past four years in Syria, Iraq, and other states of the region are both reflections of broader 
global patterns that link ethnic exclusion to ethnic conflict and recurrences of historical expe-
riences in the region. 
 
8 Our logit models include various commonly used control variables, such as relative group size, logged 
measures of GDP per capita and population figures from Hunziker and Bormann (2013), as well as cubic peace 
years (Carter and Signorino 2010). All ongoing conflicts are dropped from the analysis, and we only code new 
onsets when there is at least a two-year intermission in fighting. Full regression results are provided in the Ap-
pendix to this article. 
9 The predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals were calculated with simulation methods using Clari-
fy (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Replication code is available on request from the authors. 
10 The error term on the downgrading variable is extremely large and the effect of the variable is statistically 
insignificant, mainly because there were only very few such instances in the MENA region during the time peri-
od under observation. 
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Figure 7: Ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict around the World and in the Middle East, 1946-2013 – Group Level 
 
 
Focusing on years of ethnic conflict incidence, Table 1 shows that the group-level relationship 
between exclusion and ethnic conflict risk also holds at the country level across the MENA 
region. Countries that exclude larger relative shares of their population because of their ethnic 
identity experience more and longer spells of ethnic conflict. In this regard, Iraq and Iran lead 
the way, with six civil war onsets each. Countries with the highest levels of exclusion fight 
internal challengers during more than a third of their existence, whereas countries in the mid-
dle category spend about 20% of their country-years fighting, and states with the lowest levels 
of exclusion experience civil war in about 6% of all years. These numbers even understate the 
true extent of conflict as multiple challenges can occur at the same time but are only counted 
once. Syria constitutes somewhat of an outlier as it only experienced three onsets during the 
period of observation, which is surprising given its extremely high level of exclusion.11 
11 The current civil war might unfortunately bring it closer to its expected count. Also note that the first conflict 
occurred in a period marked by low levels of exclusion.  
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 Table 1: Ethnic exclusion and ethnic conflict incidence in the Middle East – Country Level 




Incidence Years Share of conflict 
years 
Conflict Onsets 
High (>=40%) 223 125 35.92% Morocco 1975; Israel 2000; Sudan 
1963, 1983, 2011; Syria 1979, 
2011; Iraq 1973, 1982, 1987, 1991, 
1995 
Medium (>=10%) 333 93 21.83% Lebanon 1958, 1989; Israel 1949; 
Iran 1946, 1966, 1979, 1993, 1996, 
2005; Iraq 1958, 1961, 1963; Tur-
key 1984 
Low (<10%)  221  13 5.56% Iraq 2004; Syria, 1966; Yemen 
1948, 1962, 1979, 1994 
Total 777 231 22.92%  
Note: Numbers refer to country years. Fisher’s exact test significant (p=0.000) for the degree of ethnic exclusion and conflict 
incidence. 
 
Of the various instances of political violence following the Arab Spring, the ACD2EPR da-
taset only codes the Kurdish uprising in Syria as a case of ethnic civil war. This is partly a 
consequence of the ethnically inclusive and non-elite nature of anti-regime protests in fully or 
almost homogeneous states such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, which did not involve claims 
on behalf of any ethnic group. Moreover, protests in Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, 
which did exhibit a clear ethnic dimension, either did not surpass the battle-death criterion of 
UCDP or are classified as episodes of one-sided violence because only the state used vio-
lence. Finally, the ACD2EPR dataset does not code the current civil war in Iraq, which pits 
Sunnis against the central government, as a new conflict outbreak, but rather considers it as 
part of the same conflict that has been ongoing since 2004. It is clear, however, that in the 
Arab monarchies and in Iraq dissatisfaction among members of excluded groups is on the rise 
(see, e.g., Wehrey 2014). Indeed, even the fundamentalist ISIS may be best understood as a 
reaction by the marginalized Sunni community to Shi’a dominance in Iraq (Adnan and Reese 
2014). The high levels of exclusion in states such as Jordan, Israel, and Morocco, as well as 
the very fragile situation of the entire MENA region, make additional ethnic conflict in cur-




The states in the Middle East and North Africa stand out as the most repressive regimes in the 
world with respect to ethnic power relations. Recent popular uprisings in the Arab region have 
toppled some of the most resilient dictatorial rulers of the world and are challenging the re-
gion’s predominantly authoritarian political orders. Yet the decade-long exclusion of many 
minority and majority groups from political power has not been resolved by these democratic 
movements and, in fact, may block future attempts of genuine democratization. Some of the 
ethnically more homogeneous states, such as Tunisia and – for a short time – Egypt, em-
barked on major democratic reforms. Meanwhile, the countries marked by the highest degrees 
of ethnic exclusion or discrimination, including Bahrain and Syria, experienced violent upris-
ings that were either repressed or spiraled into protracted civil conflict. 
The relationship between ethnic exclusion and conflict is not unique to the MENA re-
gion, but rather follows a global pattern. Politically excluded ethnic groups are significantly 
more likely to start ethnic rebellions than included groups. Thus, ethnic exclusion can also be 
expected to be a very risky political strategy on the part of rulers in this region. This suggests 
that ethnic inclusion and minority rights must be a central political and institutional concern if 
the new regimes emerging from the Arab Spring actually aspire to consolidate their democra-
tization efforts. Concretely, this means that possibilities of political participation should be 
distributed equally among the population at large – independent from ethnic identity – and 
broad-based inter-ethnic coalitions at the elite level during this phase of political transfor-
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Appendix II: Regression Results 
 
 (1) (2) 
DV: Ethnic Civil War Onset Full Sample Middle East 












   




   




   









   









Cubic Splines Yes Yes 
Observations 30876 3781 
Log-Likelihood -1129.90 -199.96 
χ2 483.71 1417.73 
 
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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